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Brazilian Trade Unions: 
In (In)Voluntary Confinement  
of the Corporatist Past
Karen Lang and Mona-Josée Gagnon 
many analysts of Brazilian industrial relations share a determinist vision of the 
country’s trade unionism, according to which the unions maintain a paradoxical yet 
atavistic relationship with the heavy body of laws that provide them with advan-
tages while limiting their freedom. We tested this vision by conducting field enqui-
ries into the daily activities of two Brazilian unions: the ABC metalworkers union 
and the Seamstress union for the Sao Paulo and osasco Region. In this article, we 
present the results of our case studies and what they reveal about Brazilian trade 
unionism’s relationship with the labour legislation. We also briefly discuss former 
trade union leader and current President Lula’s recent attempts to reform the coun-
try’s labour relations system.
KEyWoRDS: labour movement, corporatism, labour laws, metalworkers union, Seam-
stress union, Brazil
Brazilian labour unions have an excellent reputation in international trade union cir-
cles, often being depicted as one of the most dynamic and militant labour movements 
today. In Brazil, however, many scholars criticize the unions for having abandoned the 
struggle taken up in the late 1970s against the industrial relations system and the 
limits it imposes on their actions. Since its creation in the 1930s, the authoritarian 
corporatist labour relations system has, in fact, proven to be extremely resilient. It 
survived two periods of intense political upheaval—the trade union movement hav-
ing played a predominant role in both—and radical change to the country’s economic 
model without undergoing major transformations. The adoption of a new Constitu-
tion in 1988 introduced only minor alterations, leaving the pillars of the corporatist 
system intact until today. 
In this article, we put to the test a widespread, determinist vision of Brazilian trade 
unionism, according to which unions maintain a paradoxical yet atavistic relationship 
with the heavy body of laws that provides them with advantages while limiting their 
freedom. In order to reflect on this, we performed field enquiries on two trade unions 
carefully chosen for their archetypical profile. Our research activities were conducted 
in the midst of the debate (from June 2005 to July 2006) on the ambitious project 
to reform the industrial relations system, initiated by former trade union leader and 
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current President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva. This gave us the opportunity to discuss 
with trade unionists the pros and cons of the proposed reform. 
We will begin with a brief overview of the history of the trade union movement 
in Brazil and its interactions with the corporatist labour system. We then describe in 
more detail the methodology used for this study. Next, we present the results ob-
tained for each one of the unions. Our subsequent analysis allows us to discuss these 
results in light of the recent attempt at reform and what they reveal about Brazilian 
trade unionism’s relationship with the labour legislation.
History of the Brazilian Labour movement and the  
Corporatist Labour relations system
As in other Latin American countries, the Brazilian labour movement began in the late 
18th century under the leadership of anarchists and communists of European descent. 
Since its inception, the movement experienced successive periods of expansion and 
decline, as its actions were often met with severe State repression. Unionists had not 
yet succeeded in consolidating the movement when a coup d’état brought Getulio 
Vargas to power in 1930. 
Soon after assuming office, Vargas began to pass a series of laws with the goal of 
co-opting the movement and winning the support of the working class.1 He conceded 
many social benefits (paid holidays, maternity leave, minimum wage, etc.) considered 
advantageous in those days. As for trade unions, the laws recognized many union 
prerogatives, provided that they submit to strict controls over their activities. The of-
ficial union system, as defined by the 1943 Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT)—
which is the compilation of labour laws passed between 1930 and 1943—functioned 
according to the following rules:
•	 legal	 recognition	of	unions:	 the	Ministry	of	 Labour	 awarded	a	carta sindical or 
“union card” to unions who agreed to comply with a series of legal requirements, 
such as submitting annual budget estimates and union leaders’ biographies to the 
Ministry and requesting permission to elect new leaders; 
•	 unicidade sindical: the power to represent all workers—union members and non-
members—of a given socio-professional category in a given territory was granted 
to only one union. Thus, workers could not choose their union; they could only 
decide whether or not to sign up with the one representing their category in their 
municipality. Labour federations and confederations were also to be organized by 
socio-professional category. The State drafted the definitions of these categories.
•	 imposto sindical or union tax: all workers—affiliated and non-affiliated—had to 
pay an annual union tax, which employers were obliged to deduct from workers’ 
salaries. The Ministry of Labour was responsible for collecting the tax and distribut-
ing it among the different levels of the official union system, retaining 20% of the 
funds for the Ministry itself; 
•	 explicit	 integration	of	trade	unions	into	the	social	welfare	system:2 unions could 
only use the funds from the imposto sindical to finance social services they were 
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required by law to offer to their members, and not for other purposes (e.g., print-
ing flyers, strike funds, etc.); 
•	 right to strike: in order for a strike to be “legal,” unions had to meet certain 
requirements, namely quorum at the assemblies held to deliberate over strike 
action; 
•	 State	 intervention	in	trade	unions:	 in	addition	to	possessing	arbitrary	powers	to	
award, refuse or revoke a union’s carta sindical, the Ministry of Labour could 
attend union meetings, replace elected union leaders with its own agents and 
freeze union assets. The restrictions on the use of funds from the imposto sindical 
allowed the State to survey union finances; 
•	 conflict	 resolution	 and	 the	 collective-bargaining	 process:	 labour	 and	 employers	
organizations were required by law to engage in collective bargaining. If they 
reached an impasse during negotiations, either party could request the interven-
tion of the labour courts, known as the Justiça do Trabalho. The tribunals could 
also intervene out of their own initiative (Gacek, 1994);
•	 union	representation	in	the	workplace:	there	were	no	provisions	for	this;
•	 public	servants:	the	CLT	did	not	apply	to	public	servants.	Government	employees	
could not form professional associations or unions.
Typical of corporatist system, then: 
the State intervenes to organize social classes with the goal of integrating groups representing 
work and capital in vertical and non-conflicting organizations. These groups exist in virtue of the 
recognition awarded to them by the State. In turn, the State defines their modes of action and the 
relationship between them in a way that ensured that each part’s actions and demands would be 
restrained and harmoniously integrated for the benefit of the entire organism (Rodrigues, 1990: 
54, our translation).
Such labour legislation had long-lasting perverse effects on union practices. First, 
severe limits on union organizing had important “disorganizing” effects on the move-
ment (Boïto Jr, 1991). Strike regulations, the absence of union representatives in the 
workplace, the imposition of State-defined limits on unions’ organizational bases and 
the prohibition of horizontal ties between unions made mobilizing workers all the 
more difficult. 
Second, by guaranteeing funding and a monopoly over the representation 
of a given group of workers (through the imposto and the unicidade sindical, 
respectively), it was the State that guaranteed unions’ organizational survival, not 
the workers. This allowed for, and even encouraged, the creation and maintenance 
of labour organizations that held distant, if any, relations to the workers they claimed 
to represent. Or, what was worse, it allowed for the rise of pelegos3—that is, union 
leaders who occupied official union positions in order to advance their political careers 
or increase their personal fortunes while doing nothing for workers. Workers were 
obviously alienated from such organizations.
Another custom developed under the corporatist system was that of removing 
conflict from the workplace and deferring it until after the labour relation had been 
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terminated. The absence of union representatives in the workplace and in-company 
grievance procedures, along with a law permitting employers to fire workers without 
just cause, encouraged workers to keep problems at work to themselves until they 
were fired. Once dismissed, a minority of them sought compensation in the labour 
tribunals. Thus, workers became accustomed to resolving their problems by appealing 
to the Justiça, rather than confronting their employer directly. They rarely obtained 
results from individual appeals to labour courts due, in part, to the courts’ “chronic 
pattern of excessive delay” (French, 2004).
Although some initially contested the creation of the corporatist system, often 
denouncing it as fascist,4 Varguista5 and communist union leaders eventually opted 
for gaining control of official unions to avoid repression and to use their resources to 
mobilize workers (Alexander, 2003). Union activities expanded gradually in the 1950s 
and 1960s, thanks to the election of presidents with more lenient attitudes towards 
labour: Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961) and Joao Goulart (1961–1964). In the early 
1960s, the movement became increasingly radical,6 which was not tolerated for long. 
On March 31st 1964, the army staged a coup and established a military government. 
It then began to conduct massive purges of the labour movement, intervening in 
the unions to replace their leaders with army officers. It also adopted strict laws to 
make strike activity virtually impossible and it began to determine all wage increases, 
thereby depriving organized labour of its reason for existence (Alexander, 2003: 179). 
Pelegos thrived in this context (Riethof, 2002).
During the ten years following the coup d’état, there was virtually no sign of mil-
itant union action.7 Factory committees began to slowly reappear in the mid-1970s 
and in the late 1970s, strikes in the automotive plants in the ABC region8 announced 
the definite revival of labour militancy. The ABC Metalworkers were soon joined in 
protest by other “categories” and sectors—namely the public sector, which had been 
virtually absent from the movement before then. These waves of protest continued 
well into the 1980s, with public servants often playing a central role in them. 
Those observing the revival of the union movement—as well as many who 
participated directly in it—argued that a “new unionism” or novo sindicalismo was 
being born. They believed that labour activists had made a break with the past.9 
Novo sindicalistas criticized their predecessors from the pre-1964 era for being distant 
from workers, collaborating with pelegos and accepting the limits of the corporatist 
system. They claimed to be focussing their efforts on organizing in the workplace, 
building closer relations with workers, giving priority to defending workers’ 
immediate demands and fighting against the corporatist system and the State. Union 
autonomy and freedom were key demands of novo sindicalistas. In 1983, they defied 
the corporatist structure and founded the first union central, the Central Única dos 
Trabalhadores (CUT). 
Although new unionists made some progress in expanding trade union activity, 
in the end, they did not make a clear break with the corporatist system. Part of the 
reason stemmed from the inherent problems of the “fight from within strategy” 
adopted by the dominant opposition faction in the early 1980s. Like their commun-
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ist predecessors, these union leaders opted for fighting for control of official unions 
in order to use them to mobilize workers, as opposed to organizing outside of the 
system. As a result, they ended up revitalizing official unions, submitting (at least to 
a certain extent) to the limits the system imposes on union actions, while workers 
demobilized.10 With official unions and their resources under their control, radical 
change of the corporatist system became less urgent for many CUT leaders. Leaders 
of the other main faction of the movement (who would later found the Força Sindical 
union central in 1991) defended maintaining the system as it was. 
The federal Constitution of 1988 introduced some significant changes to the 
corporatist labour relations system. It removed one of its most repressive elements: 
the Labour Ministry’s extensive powers to intervene in union affairs. For instance, 
legal requirements for founding a trade union were relaxed and the Ministry’s role in 
this process was reduced to that of ensuring that the paperwork was in order. The 
Constitution also recognized public servants’ freedom of association and guaranteed 
all workers’ right to strike. Finally, private sector unions won the right to establish 
representatives in the workplace in companies with 200 or more employees. However, 
unions have had great difficulties in overcoming employer resistance to their presence 
in the workplace, as we shall see shortly (Rodrigues, 2000).
Although the Constitution did recognize certain freedoms or rights, it failed to 
introduce radical change to the corporatist system, as it left its three pillars intact. 
Unicidade sindical remained untouched and the imposto sindical was merely given 
a more politically correct name: “contribuição sindical”, or union contribution. The 
maintenance of these two elements, combined with the relaxation of the requirements 
to form a union, produced a grave and unexpected effect: literally thousands of “paper 
unions”—that is, organizations existing only on paper—have been created solely for 
the purpose of collecting the funds raised by the contribuição sindical (Zylberstajn, 
2005). As for the third pillar, the Constitution did not alter the Justiça do Trabalho’s 
powers to intervene in labour conflicts. 
In the 1990s, changes to the country’s economic development model forced the 
trade unions to revise their positions and strategies. The adoption of neo-liberal poli-
cies and new human resource management techniques, resulting in massive layoffs, 
led unions to focus their efforts on defending workers’ jobs. Government attempts 
to pass reforms of the official union system were generally unsuccessful during this 
period.
methodology and Choice of Case studies
Our review of the literature on Brazilian trade unionism has enabled us to note that 
few empirical studies have been conducted to examine the impact of the country’s 
corporatist labour laws on unions’ day-to-day activities. To answer our main research 
question, then, we carried out two in-field case studies. Our main hypothesis was: 
while the corporatist labour legislation continues to exert a strong influence over 
unions’ actions in various aspects, unions have a certain room to maneuver that they 
can use to develop practices that go beyond what is foreseen in the legislation.
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Our initial criteria for selecting unions for our case studies were: (i) they be based 
in Sao Paulo, the hearth of all industrial and economic activity in Brazil; and (ii) they 
represent workers from the private sector. To narrow our options, we used affiliation 
to a union central as a third criterion for dividing unions into subcategories. A union’s 
choice of central indicates its leaders’ and members’ ideological positions, which 
often influence union practices. Here, although there are several centrals in Brazil, 
we chose to study unions affiliated to the CUT and Força Sindical (FS), as they are the 
two most important organizations in terms of number of affiliates and actors on the 
country’s political scene.11 Historically, CUT and FS hold very distinct political positions: 
while the former defends socialist or social-democrat ideas, the latter clearly embraces 
capitalism. 
Within both the CUT and FS, one may find organizations with varying levels of 
activity in terms of their attempts to establish relationships with workers and defend 
their interests. A highly active union, for example, consults workers before initiating 
annual collective bargaining activities and tries to establish its presence in the work-
place. An “inactive” union rarely has contact with workers and limits its activities 
to offering a few of the “traditional” union services (legal aid, health care or leisure 
facilities). 
In general, only a minority of private sector unions affiliated to the CUT and an 
even smaller proportion of FS affiliates can be classified as “highly active”; most 
CUT and FS unions lack effective contact with the workers they claim to represent 
(Rodrigues, 2000). Even though the majority of Brazilian labour organizations can 
be considered “inactive,” we chose to focus on those in the “active” category, as 
our interest lies in the unions’ daily activities. Also, it is difficult to gain access to the 
routine activities of inactive unions. 
Based on these criteria, the following unions, which we consider archetypical, were 
selected, with the intention of verifying if they differ and if so, in what dimensions:
•	 Seamstress	Union	for	the	Sao	Paulo	and	Osasco	Region	(Costureiras): This union is 
one of the most active unions affiliated to FS and the large majority of the workers 
it represents are women.
•	 ABC	Metalworkers	Union	(Metalworkers):	This	union	is	linked	to	the	CUT	and	is	
one of the most advanced unions in terms of organizational capacity and political 
influence. In fact, the ABC Metalworkers union plays a strong leadership role in 
the movement, as other unions often attempt to implant the Metalworkers’ prac-
tices in their own bases.
We used two types of research methods for the study of these unions: partici-
pant observation and semi-guided interviews with union leaders and members. We 
observed a variety of union activities ranging from monthly barbecues for affiliates 
to protests to negotiations with company representatives. We conducted nine inter-
views with leaders and members of the Metalworkers union and eight with leaders 
and members from the Costureiras union. In both cases, the number and choice of 
interviewees was restricted by our limited access to workers.12
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We chose these research methods, as we felt they complement one another well. 
Semi-guided interviews are ideal for obtaining more detailed information on union 
practices as well as union leaders’ and workers’ perceptions of labour relations. 
Observing union activities helps to put interviewees’ responses into context and 
allows us to compare our results from the interviews to our observations, so as to 
detect differences between discourse and what is actually done.
results of our Case studies
The Seamstress union of the Sao Paulo and osasco Region
The Sindicato das Costureiras,13 as it is commonly known today, was officially created 
in 1942. Since its foundation, the union has held the monopoly of representation over 
all workers employed in the clothing industry in the municipalities of Osasco and Sao 
Paulo. There are approximately 7 500 legalized confection companies operating in the 
union’s territory today, the majority of which are small and medium-size enterprises.14 
Union leaders estimate the number of registered workers in the union’s territorial 
base to be currently at 80 000 in the formal sector and 100 000 in the informal 
sector.15 The union’s current president is also the vice-president of the Força Sindical 
union central.
The union’s top-down organizational structure is divided into two levels, the first 
being the union’s Board of Directors, which is made up of an Executive Committee, a 
Fiscal Council and a “Representative Council linked to the Federation.” All together, 
there is a total of 24 members on the Board (the maximum number allowed by the 
CLT) and they make all the decisions regarding union activities. 
Factory commissions constitute the second level of the union structure. The union 
claims to have established approximately 1 100 commissions16 in the workplace in 
the past ten years by using the law of the “acordos de compensação de horas” or 
compensation of hours agreements. According to one union leader, the CLT stipu-
lates that any company operating in a “compensação de horas” system—that is, 
from Monday to Friday with compensation for work on Saturday—is obliged to sign 
an agreement with the union regarding the work schedule. The union succeeded in 
including in these agreements the right to set up a factory commission. This is one 
example of how the Costureiras have been able to use a mechanism of the CLT to 
gain access to the workplace in a way that was not foreseen by the legislation. 
Another legal mechanism used in a similar (albeit less successful) way is the Inter-
nal Commission for the Prevention of Accidents, or CIPA in Portuguese.17 A CIPA is 
an in-company bipartite commission (employer, worker), foreseen by the CLT, whose 
mandate is to identify measures necessary to prevent accidents in the workplace. The 
Seamstresses’ Union attempts to use the CIPAs to establish contact with workers by 
offering a course for CIPA members (cipeiros) and encouraging companies to send 
their employees for CIPA training at the union’s office. The union also “accompanies” 
the elections for the commission and in some firms, one cipeiro is a member of the 
union. In many companies, however, the CIPAs still only exist on paper.
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The Costureiras’ limited presence in the workplace makes it difficult for the union 
to resolve conflicts directly with employers.18 Our observations indicate that the factory 
commissions are not very effective in forcing employers to respect agreements or 
the law. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that commission members receive 
little, if any, training for their position. Union leaders do not encourage them to act 
independently to resolve grievances directly with employers, instructing them to consult 
union officials before acting. Without a union representative with effective negotiating 
powers in the workplace, workers often keep their complaints to themselves for fear 
of employer reprisal, reporting their problems to the union only after they have been 
fired. Another factor that encourages this type of behaviour is the fact that the majority 
of seamstresses are females working in small enterprises (i.e. close proximity to often 
male bosses) and harassment is still a common practice in Brazil.
According to leaders interviewed, when they do receive complaints from a worker, 
they attempt to initiate direct negotiations with the company. If the firm refuses to 
respond, union leaders organize protests na porta da fábrica (at the factory door). If 
the union is not able to obtain satisfactory results or negotiations reach an impasse, 
the union requests a meeting with company representatives at the Labour Ministry’s 
“round tables”, in which government agents act as mediators. Union recourse to this 
mechanism is quite frequent.19 Should the problem remain unresolved, the union can 
appeal or file individual cases with the labour tribunals. All union leaders confirmed 
that the union’s legal department is currently defending several cases in the labour 
tribunals. It is clear, then, that the Costureiras union has not developed much auton-
omy in this area, remaining highly dependant on the State to intervene to resolve 
disputes.
State intervention during the collective bargaining process, on the other hand, is 
not common. Union leaders claim that neither the Costureiras union nor the employ-
ers’ organizations normally request court intervention. Recourse to the labour tribu-
nals, as well as strike action, are to be used as last resort mechanisms: 
Judicial actions and strikes are only used as a last resort. This has always been our line of thinking. 
When you end up with one of these kinds of actions, you have already lost . . . You have to negoti-
ate, negotiate, negotiate. If there is no other way, then you have to stop production . . . We make 
it clear that we don’t want to get to this point (Wanda, Union President20). 
In the union president’s eyes, requesting court intervention is a sign of defeat, 
mainly because the labour tribunals tend to side with the employers. Strikes are to be 
averted so as to avoid causing economic losses for the companies, which could have 
a negative impact on workers.21 
While the union’s collective bargaining activities are relatively free from State 
intervention, the process of negotiating the collective agreement that stipulates the 
working conditions and salaries of all workers in the Costureiras’ base (convenção 
coletiva) continues to follow the routine and rules defined by the corporatist labour 
legislation. Negotiations between representatives from the Costureiras union and the 
employers’ organizations begin a few months prior to their database—the official 
date for annual negotiations—in July. When an agreement has been reached, the 
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union presents the employers’ offer to workers in an assembly for their approval. 
Once approved, the union begins negotiating “acordos coletivos”—that is, company-
level agreements negotiated to try to obtain conditions that are better than those 
contained in the collective agreement. 
In addition to imposing a framework on the collective bargaining process, the CLT 
also contains a detailed list of benefits and rights that are (in theory) guaranteed for 
all registered workers. One may suppose, then, that the CLT influences the content of 
negotiations. For Costureira officials, the CLT is an important reference used during the 
collective bargaining process: “we take the CLT, identify a few elements and try to gain 
something better” (Wanderley, Executive Committee Director). Thus, the CLT shapes 
union demands. An examination of the union’s collective agreements confirms this: 
one finds numerous clauses that merely repeat what is stipulated by the labour laws. 
The Costureiras union leaders defend the monopoly of representation awarded 
to local unions by the State. They argue that if unicidade sindical were eliminated, 
thousands of unions would be created in the bases of existing unions, thereby further 
contributing to the fragmentation and weakening of unions’ bargaining power. They 
are willing to accept pluralism only at the higher levels of the structure (federations, 
confederations and centrals).
With regards to the third pillar of the corporatist system, the union’s main sources 
of funding are the contribuição sindical and voluntary membership fees. Interviewees 
claimed that the elimination of the imposto would not affect their union. That said, 
the union president is in favour of some kind of obligatory tax for all workers, as she 
believes that no one would pay if the law did not force them to do so.
ABC metalworkers union
The Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos do ABC,22 or the ABC Metalworkers Union, was 
founded as an official union in 1932. It has often played a central role in the labour 
movement, especially during the resurgence of union activity at the end of the 1970s. 
The union also contributed greatly to the founding of the CUT, in which it still has much 
influence today. President Lula’s political career began as a leader of this union.
The ABC Metalworkers Union (herein referred to as the Metalworkers) currently 
represents all metalworkers in the metallurgical, mechanical and electric material 
plants in the ABC region—with the exception of those from Sao Caetano do Sul.23 
There are over 100 000 metalworkers employed in more than 1000 companies in the 
region. The employees of the automotive plants account for 60% of all metalworkers 
in the union’s jurisdiction, of which approximately 75% are union members. 
The union’s organizational structure differs greatly from that of the Costureiras and 
has changed significantly since the 1970s. It was originally composed of 24 directors, 
plus a few workers’ committees operating clandestinely in the factories in the 1950s, 
the 1960s and again in the late 1970s. In 1981, the union succeeded in establishing 
its first “official” factory committee in the Ford plant—official in the sense that the 
committee’s activities were regulated by a company-level agreement.24 Following the 
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victory in the Ford factory, the union set up committees in several other companies, 
the majority of them being in the larger automotive plants. Their mandate is typical 
of any factory committee and all workers—union members and non-members—may 
participate in elections.
In the 1980s, in addition to establishing factory committees, the union mobilized 
to get its members elected to the CIPAs:
Before winning the right to establish a factory committee, the mechanism union activists used here 
in the factory was the CIPA, because their stability is protected by law. They succeeded in acting to 
a certain extent in the factory, talking to workers and all. Thus, the CIPAs were an important instru-
ment for the union movement at the end of the 1970s, early 1980s (Ronaldo, factory committee 
member at the Mercedes plant in Sao Bernando do Campo).
As this quote suggests, the union would get their members elected to the 
commission, so as to benefit from the legal protections bestowed on CIPA members 
during their mandate. Cipeiros would use their position to communicate with workers 
and set up factory committees. In this way, CIPAs played a central role in the union’s 
efforts to expand its presence in the workplace. 
In 1999, the union began to create Comitês Sindicais de Empresa (CSE) or Com-
pany Union Committees in order to further its presence in the factories. The CSEs 
were to have the same function as factory committees and their activities are regu-
lated by company-level agreements. However, only union members may participate 
in CSE elections. Once again, the union used the CIPAs to implant CSEs in factories 
throughout its territory: 
And then something very interesting happened. As there was no legal provision on this matter, 
there was no legal impediment. . . . So we started to put in the [CSEs] people who had stability as 
elected members of CIPAs. . . . There wasn’t much the company could do because these people 
already had their stability guaranteed for another year—the time they were still in the CIPA. We 
gave our CSE members a 3-year mandate (Danilo, Executive Council member).
When a cipeiro’s mandate ended, the union would convince the company to let 
workers finish their CSE mandates. By doing so, the company accepted de facto that 
a CSE be established in their factory. 
The CSEs did not, however, replace the existing factory commissions. In some 
factories, one may find a CSE and a factory commission, as well as union activists 
occupying positions in the CIPA (CIPAs are not part of the union structure).25 In plants 
where factory commissions are already in place, the union may also set up a CSE in 
order to establish the highest number of workers’ representatives on the shop floor 
as possible. 
The CSEs are at the heart of the union’s organizational structure today. Elections 
for CSEs are held in the factories and the number of CSE members is proportionate 
to the number of union members in a given factory. As of March 2006, the union 
had CSEs in 88 enterprises and one CSE for retired workers, with a total of 240 CSE 
members. All 240 of them make up the “Diretoria pleina do sindicato,” or the Full 
Directorate, which constitutes the first level of the union’s organizational structure. 
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The next level is that of the Conselho da diretoria or Executive Council. The council 
is made up of 27 members elected from the 240 CSE members. Council members 
choose 9 persons amongst themselves to sit on the union Board of Directors and de-
cide which position each board member will occupy. The only member of the board 
who is elected directly by workers is the union president.
As for collective bargaining activities, like the Costureiras union, the Metalworkers 
follow the schema stipulated in the CLT. The Metalworkers’ union’s database is set 
for November of every year and negotiations begin a few months earlier so as to 
reach an agreement before the database. The CUT Metalworkers’ Federation for the 
State of Sao Paulo and the São Caetano do Sul Metalworkers’ union (FS) represent 
workers at the bargaining table and must negotiate with several groups of employers’ 
organizations.26 When an agreement has been reached between parties, the union 
holds an assembly to present the employers’ offer to all workers for their approval or 
disapproval. Once approved, the ABC Metalworkers Union leaders then proceed to 
negotiate acordos coletivos with individual companies to try to secure conditions that 
are more advantageous than those included in the collective agreement. 
Union leaders admitted that like the Costureiras Union, they still use the CLT as a 
reference prior to negotiations to verify what is already guaranteed by law and which 
aspects they can improve upon. In this way, the CLT shapes this union’s demands to 
a certain extent. Contrary to the Seamstresses’ Union, however, the Metalworkers 
Union is able to introduce new items at the negotiating table and in collective agree-
ments.27 The factory committees are a case in point: the union began mobilizing 
workers clandestinely (thus outside of law). Through strike action, they were able to 
have the committees officially recognized in an acordo coletivo. 
Justiça intervention during the Metalworkers’ collective bargaining process is also 
rare. The union does not rely on the tribunals to intervene during negotiations, yet for 
different reasons than the Costureiras. Negotiating agreements and resolving conflicts 
by themselves is clearly seen by Metalworker leaders as a sign of union strength; for 
them, only pelegos or weak unions resort to the Justiça. Companies, on the other 
hand, occasionally request intervention, usually in reaction to the union’s decision 
to initiate strike action. During annual negotiations in November 2005, for instance, 
Volkswagen asked the tribunals to prevent workers from going on strike. The judge 
responded positively to the company’s request, threatening to impose a heavy fine 
on the union if it declared a strike. Workers ignored the threat and stayed off the job 
for 30 days. Thus, even though the union still has to deal with possible intervention 
from the Justiça, this does not stop it from engaging in autonomous forms of action 
(strikes) to defend its demands during negotiations. 
As for conflicts arising in the workplace, union leaders attempt to negotiate a 
solution directly with the employer. In companies where a CSE, a CIPA or a factory 
committee exists, committee members are responsible for this task; in smaller firms 
where the union is not present, higher-level union leaders are called upon to inter-
vene directly.28 Union intervention is more effective in companies where union leaders 
are present. 
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According to union leaders, the large majority of conflicts are resolved through 
direct negotiations. If no agreement is reached, they may organize a short-term strike 
to pressure the company to give in to their demands. When strike activity fails to 
produce the desired results, the union may explore the possibility of presenting a case 
before the labour tribunals. Judicial actions initiated by the Metalworkers Union are 
quite rare and are employed only as last-resort mechanisms, as they are, in the leaders’ 
opinion, signs of weakness. This negative view of the Justiça—common among Novo 
sindicalistas in the 1980s—has been incorporated into the values of this faction of the 
movement, which indicates that there has been a change in union culture.
The Metalworkers Union would also like to have more autonomy in deciding which 
group of workers they represent. Past attempts to negotiate benefits for the adminis-
trative or cleaning staff of a company, for example, have been contested and won by 
smaller unions whose monopoly of representation of these workers is guaranteed by 
unicidade sindical. Thus, the Metalworkers are in favour of its abolition, as this quote 
clearly suggests: “If [unicidade sindical] were to be eliminated tomorrow, half of the 
unions would disappear. And what’s worse, workers wouldn’t even notice.” (Danilo, 
Executive Council member).
As for the obligatory union tax, union leaders are proud to say that their union 
must go to court every year to have workers in its jurisdiction exempted from the 
contribuição sindical. The Metalworkers Union was, in fact, one of the first unions 
to return these funds to workers. To ensure financing for its activities, the union has 
created a new tax, the “negotiating fee”, that all workers in its base must pay. It 
justifies its actions by stating that since all workers benefit from the union’s collective 
bargaining activities, everyone should have to contribute. Although union leaders 
express some pride about going against the system, in the end, they reproduce its 
logic by imposing fees on all workers in their base.
Discussion: our Case studies and the resilience of the  
industrial relations system to reform
Our case studies clearly show that the corporatist labour legislation in Brazil continues 
to have a significant impact on the practices of private sector unions. The collective 
bargaining process still runs according to the rules and procedures established by the 
CLT, and the CLT shapes union demands. That said, it is clear that despite the rigidity 
of the laws, some unions attain the capacity of going beyond them, imposing new 
rules on employers and adopting better codes of conduct for internal democracy. As 
stated earlier, literature on Brazilian trade unions suggests that our Costureiras case is 
much more the norm than the Metalworkers. Indeed, the ABC Metalworkers Union29 
is one of the few Brazilian unions with sufficient organizational and mobilizing cap-
acity to introduce new subjects on the bargaining table; the majority of unions, like 
the Costureiras, settle for slight improvements on what the CLT already guarantees. 
While union recourse to the Justiça during annual negotiations has become less fre-
quent, the same cannot be said for the resolution of workers’ complaints in the work-
place. The majority of unions in Brazil are similar to the Costureiras in that they still 
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rely on the intervention of the Ministry of Labour or the Justiça to resolve such dis-
putes. Only a few unions are able to negotiate solutions directly with employers like 
the Metalworkers do. The Metalworkers union leaders’ disdain for requesting State 
intervention indicates that there has been a change in union culture among members 
of this faction of the labour movement. 
Yet even within the rigid framework of the corporatist laws, some margin to 
maneuver does exist and is used by unions to strengthen their organizational 
capacity and improve their relationship with workers. A prime example of this is 
the Metalworkers’ use of CIPAs to set up factory committees with the capacity to 
effectively defend workers’ rights. In this aspect, this union has gone far beyond 
what is foreseen by the law. Unfortunately, the Metalworkers Union is unique in 
this area. Other CUT unions have attempted to implement the Metalworkers’ model 
in their bases, but they have had only mitigated success. Though many have been 
able to get union members elected to CIPAs and some have delegates present in the 
workplace, very few have in-factory committees. As for FS affiliates, the Costureiras 
union is one of the rare organizations that have attempted to establish any presence 
in the workplace, let alone contact with workers. As we observed, this union’s factory 
committees are not very successful in defending workers’ rights.
As for union leaders’ views on unicidade and the contribuição sindical, the ideas 
they defended during the interviews are in sync with the CUT’s and FS’ official positions. 
While the CUT’s national executive supports putting an end to unicidade, the FS wants 
it upheld so as to guarantee the survival of its members, allowing pluralism only at 
the upper levels of the structure, which, in fact, already exists. Both the CUT and the 
FS have their own National Metalworkers Confederation, for example. With regards 
to the obligatory union tax, leaders from both unions hold somewhat ambivalent 
positions towards what should be adopted in its place.
Our research demonstrates, then, some heterogeneity in union practices and 
views. A small minority of CUT unions have developed more autonomous actions, 
whereas the vast majority of Brazilian unions find themselves stuck in the CLT straight 
jacket, relying on it for their survival. This is why the newly elected President Lula, 
who had experienced as a trade unionist the difficulties of building strong unions 
within the framework of the CLT, included reforming the corporatist system in his list 
of priorities during his first presidential mandate. 
Shortly after assuming office in 2003, President Lula announced the creation of 
a tripartite committee—the National Labour Forum (Forum Nacional do Trabalho)—
whose mandate was to draft a proposal for reforming the corporatist labour relations 
system.30 After 18 months of heated negotiations and despite the lack of consensus 
among the Forum’s members, the Minister of Labour submitted a reform project with 
over 200 articles to Congress. Although the proposal is too complex to be analyzed 
in detail here, we will briefly discuss the main points and their possible impacts on 
unions’ actions and autonomy.
One of the most controversial issues was that of union representation in the work-
place. If the reform had been adopted, unions would have been granted the power 
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to establish at least one representative in every business with 35 or more employees. 
The representative’s mandate would have been to negotiate solutions to workers’ 
problems directly with employers. Thus, the reform would have introduced a new first 
step in the conflict resolution process. This alteration, defended by progressive CUT 
unions, should have helped active unions to increase their bargaining power with 
employers and encouraged them to develop more autonomous actions. On the other 
hand, as the reform would have maintained and even facilitated union recourse to 
the labour courts, it would have allowed unions that currently rely on State interven-
tion to continue to do so. It is likely, then, that the overall impact of this change would 
have been limited.
Proposed changes to financing unions included replacing the contribuição sindical 
and two other existing union taxes with a single “negotiating fee.” Union leaders 
claim that this tax would be “more democratic” as workers would define the amount 
during an assembly. Even so, all workers—union members or not—would still have 
been obliged to pay the fee. Thus, although labour determines the amount, by making 
it obligatory, the State would have continued to guarantee union funding to a certain 
extent. Such a functioning could not be qualified as heretical by North American 
trade unionists who find normal that all employees pay the union dues because they 
benefit from collective bargaining activities. In Quebec, it is even compulsory. Another 
example is the French trade unions that are financially supported by the State without 
question. But the situation in Brazil raises other problems. Employers do not always 
recognize trade unions, collective bargaining is often a futile exercise, and cases of 
union corruption persist. 
The boundaries of union organizing at the local level would also have continued 
to be defined by the system, and not by unions. First of all, the reform project pro-
posed that workers be regrouped by ramos or “branches” of economic activity, as 
opposed to socio-professional categories. Although this would have allowed unions 
to broaden their base of representation, they would still not have had full autonomy 
to define the limits of their membership, as a tri-partite commission would have 
been responsible for drafting the definitions of the branches. Secondly, existing 
unions would have been allowed to retain their monopoly of representation pro-
vided that they prove to the Labour Ministry they are “representative”—that is, 20% 
of all workers in their jurisdiction are union members. The other option would have 
been to “borrow representativeness” from higher-level organizations (federations, 
confederations or centrals). In addition to reintroducing the Labour Ministry’s control 
over unions’ internal activities, this measure could have increased unions’ reliance 
on the centrals. 
One of the few proposed measures obtaining consensus in the labour movement 
was the recognition of the centrals as part of the official union system. The extensive 
powers they would have been awarded, however, gave rise to much debate. Accord-
ing to the reform project, the centrals could initiate negotiations at any level and the 
results of these negotiations could not be altered by bargaining activities at lower 
levels. Furthermore, the centrals would have been able to found lower-level organi-
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zations to complete their “organic” structure. Many actors criticized this attempt to 
concentrate power in the hands of the centrals at the expense of local unions.
The reforma sindical submitted to Congress in 2005 was, in fact, the result of a se-
ries of compromises between a minority of union leaders wishing to introduce some 
change to the system and the large majority of actors who defend maintaining the 
status quo. Had it been adopted, it would have contributed little to providing unions 
with a greater leeway to increase their autonomy and strengthen their relations with 
workers. On the contrary, the reform as proposed might have helped to perpetuate 
the top-down, bureaucratic model of union organization and to maintain a significant 
level of State intervention. We can hypothesize that the authors of the reform tried 
at the same time to favour the progressive Cutista unions, control the corrupt ele-
ments and permit unions to build a better balance of power vis-à-vis employers. Such 
contradictory ambitions had the inevitable consequence of raising criticisms from all 
sides. Employers were unanimously against it, mainly because it would have forced 
them to accept union presence in the workplace and because it did not include pro-
posals to “flexibilize” workers’ rights. Trade unions were divided, some declaring in 
public their opposition to it. In the end, the government was forced to abandon the 
reform project, opting more pragmatically for presenting parts of the reform as sepa-
rate laws to the Congress. Since the beginning of Lula’s second presidential mandate, 
for instance, a law recognizing union centrals as part of the official union system—
with more restricted powers that what was originally proposed—has been adopted. 
Other laws proposing change to certain aspects of the labour relations system are 
awaiting judgment in the Congress.
Conclusion
In this article, we attempted to contest a determinist view of the influence of Brazilian 
labour laws on industrial relations and trade unions’ ways of functioning. We dem-
onstrated that, while the CLT is still a straightjacket for many unions (whose leaders 
do not necessarily try to free themselves from it), it was possible for other unions to 
innovate and introduce more autonomous practices. It would be too simplistic, how-
ever, to conclude that if some were able to innovate, everyone else should be able 
to do the same. Labour laws determine the ability of trade unions to do so only to a 
certain extent; other elements of analysis must be considered. Bargaining strength, 
for instance, differs greatly according to a series of objective factors. The configura-
tion of the Brazilian labour market—with its millions of unqualified workers seeking 
stable employment (the majority of them being unemployed or employed in informal 
sector)—presents a major challenge for trade unions in all sectors. Another part of the 
equation is the will to change. In this sense, establishing union democracy in Brazil 
still requires profound reform of the country’s current labour laws. 
One of the main challenges to reforming the system is the difficulty in making 
a clear distinction between rights that have been conceded to unions as part of a 
corporatist framework and rights that should have developed gradually in a demo-
cratic society. To put it another way, President Lula’s explicit intention to transform an 
brazilian trade unions: in (in)voluntarY conFinement oF the corporatist past 265
authoritarian corporatist framework into a pluralist neocorporatist one has proven 
to be too ambitious. Another challenge is convincing actors involved that increased 
autonomy from the State could contribute to a much-needed revitalization of the 
movement. Finally, for real change to occur, it will be necessary to remove from posi-
tions of power those whose interests lay more so in their organization’s survival than 
in the defence of workers’ rights and interests.
notes
1 There is some controversy over the motives behind Vargas’ adoption of the corporatist labour 
legislation, see French (2004: 37–39).
2 Terminology used by Gacek (1994).
3 The word “pelego” was originally used to designate the blanket put on a horse under a 
saddle.
4 Some authors claim that the Brazilian corporatist system was inspired principally by Mussolini’s 
Carta del Lavoro. French explains that while the system undeniably has a pronounced 
authoritarian, even fascist, dimension, it was not derived exclusively from European fascist, 
corporatist and right-wing Catholic sources (French, 2004: 15–16).
5 “Varguista” is the term used to designate supporters of Getulio Vargas.
6 Between 1961 and 1963, two hundred general strikes were held. For more details, see 
Alexander (2003).
7 The 1968 Osasco and Contagem strikes and less well-known strike led by Willy’s/Ford 
factory committee in ABC were important exceptions. Between 1968 and 1973, other 
isolated attempts to resist (sabotage, slowdowns) have been documented (Antunes and 
Nogueira, 1982).
8 The term “ABC region” is used to designate seven municipalities in the greater Sao Paulo 
region (Santo André, Sao Bernando do Campo, Sao Caetano do Sul, Diadema, Maua, Rio 
Grande da Serra and Riberao Pires) in which several factories serving the automotive industry 
were set up in the 1950s. 
9 Santana provides an interesting analysis of the development of the concept of “novo 
sindicalismo.” He criticizes some intellectuals for their lack of objectivity, which led them to 
reinforce the idea of a break with the past and ignore the signs of a certain continuity with 
the pre-1964 period. Many failed to recognize the strength of State control mechanisms 
on the union movement and the culture that was developed around it, which survived the 
dictatorship and the return to democracy. He also points out that many CUT and PT activists 
had been politically socialized by those whom they criticized so strongly (Santana, 1999).
10 For a more detailed criticism of this strategy, see Boïto Jr. (1991).
11 The other centrals represent only approximately 10% of unions affiliated to centrals.
12 One company in the Metalworkers’ base, Kostal, refused to authorize our presence in the 
factory. Our attempt to interview workers in a clothing factory in Sao Paulo had to be aborted 
due to the factory owner’s hostility.
13 The official name of the union is: Sindicato dos Oficiais Alfaiates, Costureiras e Trabalhadores 
nas Indústrias de Confecção de Roupas e de Chapéus de Senhoras de São Paulo ao Município 
de Osasco.
14 For an interesting analysis of the changes in the clothing industry in Sao Paulo since the 
1980s, see Leite (2004).
15 Precise data on unionization rates in the sector were unavailable at the time of our research 
activities.
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16 This number included commissions and companies where at least one member of the CIPA 
is also a union member. We were unable to confirm the number of factory commissions.
17 The full name in Portuguese is Comissão Interna de Prevenção de Acidentes.
18 Union representatives (factory commissions or CIPA members) are present in only 14% of 
the companies operating in the union’s territory and, of course, absent in the clandestine 
operations, which employ the majority of workers in the industry.
19 It was not possible to confirm the number of times the union resorted to the Ministry’s round 
tables during the year, as such information was not available to the general public. 
20 Throughout this article, the union leaders’ names, but not their positions in the union, have 
been modified.
21 This more conciliatory attitude towards employers and their profits is common amongst FS 
leaders.
22 Due to changes in municipal boundaries or disputes between political factions in the union’s 
base, the union has changed its name and territorial base several times since its foundation. 
Today, it goes by the name Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos do ABC. For more information, see 
<www.smabc.org.br>.
23 At the time of our in-field research activities, the union represented workers from the 
Santo André and Maua municipalities. In mid-2007, a judicial decision modified the union’s 
territorial base.
24 This committee has existed since the 1960s. During the military dictatorship, it organized 
clandestinely. Since the 1968 strike, Ford recognizes the committee in practice, but the 
committee was only formally recognized in 1981 (Negro, 2002).
25 In a few companies, the committees have been grouped together into one called a Sistema 
única de representação (SUR). The configuration of the SURs varies from one company to 
another. For example, in the Scania factory, members of the factory committee, the CSE and 
the CIPA participate in the SUR; in the Volkswagen plant, the CSE is separate from the SUR.
26 Prior to 1992, all companies were represented by the FIESP at the bargaining table. However, 
divisions split FIESP members into several employers’ groups. Since then, unions have been 
forced to negotiate collective agreement group by group (Galvão, 1999). 
27 A study on collective agreements found several examples of items that appeared first in one 
category and were later extended to other categories. Although the report from this study 
does not specify in which categories the norms appeared for the first time, it is highly likely 
that in the majority of cases, the ABC Metalworkers Union was at the origin of new norms 
(DIEESE, 2001).
28 Union members interviewed confirmed that workers experiencing difficulties on the job seek 
out committee members’ help.
29 We are not speaking here of all of the metalworkers unions affiliated to the CUT, as we have 
not observed the functioning of other local unions. 
30 It is interesting to note that the old labour confederations, who are against any changes 
to the system, were not invited to participate in the Forum’s discussions (see Zylberstajn, 
2005).
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résumé
Le syndicalisme brésilien ou la difficile émancipation d’un 
passé corporatiste
Jusqu’aux toutes dernières décennies du XXe siècle, la société brésilienne a vécu 
presque continuellement sous le joug d’un régime corporatiste autoritaire lequel, à 
force de lois aussi précises que contraignantes, a mis le syndicalisme dans un état 
de tutelle, combinant des avantages en faveur des membres des appareils syndicaux, 
des dispositions sociales relativement généreuses à l’égard des salariés de même 
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qu’un contrôle étroit sur l’action syndicale. Le retour de la démocratie, une nouvelle 
constitution (1988), des élections présidentielles démocratiques, avec comme dernier 
président élu Luis Inacio « Lula » da Silva, lui-même ancien chef syndical, auraient 
pu laisser présager l’entrée du syndicalisme brésilien dans une toute nouvelle étape 
de son histoire. Cet article constitue une contribution à l’analyse de l’état actuel 
du syndicalisme brésilien qui, dans le monde syndical international, jouit d’une 
réputation enviable pour ce qui est des syndicalismes des économies en émergence. 
Cet enthousiasme n’est toutefois pas toujours partagé par les chercheurs brésiliens 
eux-mêmes, souvent plus sceptiques sur la capacité du syndicalisme brésilien de 
développer une combativité dépassant le niveau discursif et de rompre avec des 
décennies de rapports incestueux avec l’état. 
C’est à partir de l’étude du fonctionnement de deux syndicats archétypiques (le Syndicat 
des Métallos de la région de ABC de Sao Paulo de la Central Unica dos Trabalhadores et 
le Syndicat des Costureiras de Sao Paulo et osasco de la centrale Força Sindical), affiliés 
à des confédérations aux idéologies opposées, que la discussion est menée, et cela sur 
la base d’une mise en contexte historique. Des méthodes qualitatives ont été utilisées, 
à savoir l’analyse documentaire, des entretiens et des observations. Il est démontré 
qu’alors que les Métallos réussissent à utiliser la loi pour construire un rapport de force, 
notamment par la mise sur pied de structures syndicales plus participatives, l’action du 
syndicat des couturières est beaucoup plus à la remorque des droits juridiques accordés 
aux syndicats. De même, alors que les Métallos ne répugnent pas à l’action directe, le 
maître-mot du syndicat des couturières est « négociation ». Et il appert que l’ensemble 
des syndicalistes interviewés, tous des responsables originaires de la base, considèrent 
plutôt précaire la situation du syndicalisme brésilien.
Les auteures en viennent ainsi à une conclusion nuancée, selon laquelle les différents 
syndicats usent différemment de leurs marges de manœuvre, certains de façon plus 
émancipatrice, aucun d’eux ne pouvant toutefois prétendre rompre les ponts avec des 
décennies d’un encadrement juridique pesant. Par ailleurs, tous les syndicats du Brésil 
n’ont pas le choix que d’inscrire leur activité dans un encadrement juridique qui fait 
peu de place aux membres de la base de même qu’à la vie syndicale dans les milieux 
de travail. C’est pourquoi le seul désir d’instaurer une vie syndicale démocratique (le 
cas des Métallos) exige en fait une imagination et une détermination particulières. Les 
modalités concrètes du fonctionnement de chacun des syndicats autorisent ce constat, et 
tranchent en outre avec des analyses répandues qui assimilent la réalité du syndicalisme 
brésilien au discours militant de certains de ses éléments.
L’analyse des tentatives de réforme du régime de relations industrielles du gouvernement 
du PT (Lula) permet d’offrir un éclairage complémentaire sur la situation du syndicalisme 
brésilien. Fraîchement élu, Lula mettait sur pied une commission tripartite chargée de 
proposer une ambitieuse réforme des lois du travail susceptible de rompre avec un cadre 
juridique considéré de façon générale comme étant d’inspiration mussolinienne. Le 
volumineux document en forme de projet de loi qui émana de la commission fut déposé 
en l’absence de consensus de ses membres et fut rapidement l’objet de nombreuses 
critiques de la part tant du patronat que de plusieurs syndicats. C’est ainsi que Lula 
fut amené, au début de son deuxième mandat, à renoncer à toute réforme globale et 
à proposer plutôt des modifications moins ambitieuses et ciblant des éléments précis 
de fonctionnement, comme la reconnaissance des confédérations syndicales ou le 
prélèvement des cotisations syndicales. Parallèlement, le gouvernement brésilien actuel 
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tente de mettre sur pied des institutions et une culture tripartite pour mettre en relation 
état, patronat et syndicats, sur le modèle social-démocrate. 
Tant les études de cas menées à Sao Paulo que la saga de la réforme avortée de 
l’encadrement juridique mettent en relief, à leur façon, les paradoxes de la société 
brésilienne et de son syndicalisme. L’absence d’une tradition syndicale autonome, 
des décennies de répression gouvernementale et étatique, la présence récurrente de 
syndicats inefficaces dotés de dirigeants souvent corrompus, une tendance marquée à la 
politisation des débats et au sectarisme sont autant d’éléments qui rendent difficile une 
transformation profonde et rapide des fonctionnements syndicaux. La « modernisation » 
du syndicalisme brésilien apparaît donc devoir faire l’objet d’un processus lent et d’une 
politique des petits pas, fondés sur une appropriation graduelle par les syndicats de la 
base des objectifs de cette modernisation. Les tentatives du président actuel de mettre 
sur pied des fonctionnements néo-corporatistes de type démocratique sur les reliefs 
d’un corporatisme autoritaire s’inscrit aussi dans ce processus.  
MoTS-CLéS : mouvement ouvrier, corporatisme, législation du travail, syndicat des 
Métallos, syndicat des couturières, Brésil
resumeN
Sindicatos brasileños : confinamiento (in)voluntario del pasado 
corporatista
Muchos analistas brasileños de relaciones industriales comparten la visión determinista 
del sindicalismo de país, en concordancia con lo cual los sindicatos todavía mantienen una 
relación atávica paradoxal con el cargado conjunto de leyes que les procuran ventajas y al 
mismo tiempo limitan su libertad. Nosotros examinamos esta visión mediante encuestas 
de terreno durante la actividad cotidiana de dos sindicatos brasileños : el Sindicato de 
metalúrgicos ABC y el Sindicato Seamstress de las regiones de Sao Paolo y osasco. En 
este artículo, nosotros presentamos los resultados de nuestros estudios de caso y lo que 
ello revela respecto a la relación de los sindicatos brasileños con la legislación laboral. 
Discutimos brevemente los intentos del antiguo líder sindical y actual presidente Lula 
por reformar el sistema de relaciones laborales del país.
PALABRAS CLAVES : movimiento laboral, corporatismo, leyes laborales, Sindicato metalúr-
gico, Sindicato Seamstress, Brasil
